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1951 CASE NOTES 21 1 
remembered that the presumption favors the religious interests,93 and 
unless the Commission can demonstrate some overriding state interest, 
the free exercise claims must prevail. 
Consumer Credit -TRUTH IN LENDING ACT - CREDITOR DEFINED AND 
DAMAGES AND RESCISSION JOINTLY AWARDED -Eby v.  Reb Realty, Inc., 
495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974). 
In October, 1969, Betty Eby purchased a residential dwelling from 
Reb Realty, Inc., for $16,700. T o  finance the transaction, Eby assumed 
a Veteran's Administration mortgage and executed a second mortgage in 
favor of Reb Realty. Eby made subsequent payments on the first mort- 
gage, but ultimately defaulted on both mortgages, whereupon Reb 
Realty properly reentered and took possession of the property. Eby sued 
in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona for rescis- 
sion and damages based on Reb Realty's admitted nondisclosure of credit 
terms and rescission rights at the time of sale as required by the Truth in 
Lending Act (the Act).' Reb Realty argued that it was not a "creditor" 
within the meaning of the Act and thus not subject to its provisions. Al- 
ternatively, Reb Realty contended that Eby must elect her remedies in 
that she was not entitled to both rescission and damages. The district 
court granted summary judgment in Eby 's favor, awarding both rescis- 
sion and damages, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2 
The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to enhance economic 
stabilization and strengthen competition among those engaged in the 
extension of consumer credit. This purpose is accomplished by disclo- 
sure of certain credit terms to those who use such credit.3 Among the 
matters required to be disclosed are the annual percentage rate of in- 
terest, the total amount financed, the amount of periodic payments, and 
93See text accompanying note 23 supra. 
'15 U.S.C. $8 1601-65 (1970). For a general discussion of the Truth in Lending Act and 
related matters see e.g., J. ABRAHAM, TRUTH IN F ~ A L  ESTATE LENDING (1970); Aldridge, Truth- 
in-Lending in Real Estate Transactions, 48 N. CAR. L. REV. 427 (1970); Boyd, The Federal 
Consumer Credit Protection Act - A Consumer Perspective, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 171 (1969); 
Griffith, Truth-in-lending and Real Estate Transactions: Some Aspects, 2 OHIO N.L. REV. 1 
(1974); McLean, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 199 (1968); 
Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and Case Law Concerning Consumer Credit, 6 ST. 
MARY'S L. J.  37 (1974); Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of Coverage, 24 
STAN. L. Fhv. 793 (1972); Note, Recent Developments in Truth in Lending Class Actions and 
Proposed Alternatives, 27 STAN. L. REV. 10 1 (1974). 
2Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (1974). The district court opinion is not officially 
reported. 
315 U.S.C. $ 1601 (1970). 
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a description of security interests taken.4 Failure to make these disclo- 
sures can subject a creditor to damages of double the finance charge of 
the transaction.5 In addition, when residential real property is retained 
as security, the creditor must disclose the consumer's-right to rescind the 
transaction within 3 business days of consummation. This right of rescis- 
sion is extended indefinitely if disclosure is not made.6 
T o  be subject to its provisions, a lender must be a "creditor" within the 
meaning of the Act. This classification applies to those who arrange 
credit or regularly extend credic7 but thus far the courts have not inter- 
preted this definition as it applies to those who extend credit at irregular 
intervals.8 The Eby court addressed the issue as one of first impression. 
4Id. $9 1635-39. These sections contain requirements of disclosure for open end consumer 
credit plans (defined at Id. 5 1602(i)), consumer sales, and other plans. See generally Aldridge, 
Truth-in-Lending in Real Estate Transactions, 48 N .  CAR. L. REV. 427, 448-49 (1970) [here- 
inafter cited as Aldridge] ; Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and Case Law, 6 ST. 
MARY'S L. J. 37,49-62 (1  974). 
515 U.S.C. 5 1640(a) (1970) states: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails in connection with 
any consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person any information required under 
this part to be disclosed to that person is liable to that person in an amount equal to the 
sum of 
(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction, except 
that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; 
and 
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the 
action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court. 
Certain defenses are also provided by this section: (1) Liability will not be imposed if correc- 
tion of an error in disclosure is made within 15 days of discovery and prior to notice or institu- 
tion of suit by a debtor. Under this provision a creditor must also make proper adjustments 
to assure that a consumer does not pay a finance charge in excess of that actually disclosed. 
Id. 1640(b). (2) Likewise, liability will not be imposed for unintentional violations of the 
Act where reasonable procedures are maintained to avoid such errors. Id. 5 1640(c). 
6Id. 8 1635(a) states in part: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of any consumer credit trans- 
action in which a security interest is retained or acquired in any real property which is 
used or is expected to be used as the residence of the person to whom credit is extended, 
the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third 
business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the dis- 
closures required under this section and all other material disclosures required under 
this part, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of 
the Board, of his intention to do so. 
This section is limited to second liens; the right is not available where first liens are created 
or retained to finance acquisition of the consumer's personal residence. Id. 5 1635(e). 
The effect of rescission is: (1) the consumer is no longer liable under the agreement, (2) any 
security interest becomes void, and (3) the creditor must return all money and property re- 
ceived under the transaction. Id. § 1635(b). 
' Id .  § 1602(f); see note 19 infra. 
8Courts have construed the definition of "creditor" insofar as it applies to an "arranger" of 
credit. See Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Philbeck v. 
Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 
971 (5th Cir. 1974); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
Courts have also considered whether parties are "creditors" even though no finance charge is 
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The second issue in the case concerned the propriety of awarding 
rescission and damages jointly. Courts have been in conflict over whether 
such a joint remedy is available for a violation of the Act. When the 
question was first addressed in Bostwick v. Cohen,g the Federal District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio resorted to the traditional elec- 
tion of remedies doctrinelo and held that rescission and damages were 
both remedial in nature and could not be jointly awarded. In a sub- 
sequent case, Palmer v. Wilson,ll the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California concluded that a literal reading of 
the Act would allow both remedies. By this time Bostwick had been 
effectively undermined by the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,12 wherein the Court 
indicated that damages provided for under the Act were actually in the 
nature of a "civil penalty."l3 With the Bostwick position that rescission 
and damages were both remedial measures thus questioned, the Palmer 
court granted both remedies.l* 
In the instant case the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment holding that Reb Realty was a "creditor" within the 
meaning of the Act. The court concluded that there were no disputed 
issues of fact and that the creditor issue was neither so complex nor in- 
sufficiently highlighted as to warrant further factual elucidation. Con- 
sidering definitions of a "creditor" under the Act and Regulations,15 
public position letters issued by the Federal Reserve Board,l6 and legis- 
imposed. See Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 41 1 U.S. 356 (1973); Rootberg v. 
American Express Co., 352 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Garland v. Mobil Oil Corp., 340 F. 
Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
9319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970). 
lOThe common understanding of the election of remedies doctrine is that where an ag- 
grieved party "has two inconsistent remedies available to him for the redress of a single right, 
he must elect one of those remedies." Dobbs, Pressing Problems for the Plaintiffs h w y e r  in 
Rescission: Election of Remedies and Restoration of Consideration, 26 ARK. L. REV. 322, 325 
(1972). The author states that an analysis of consistency begs the question; the result really 
depends upon whether the court believes both remedies "ought to be granted." Id. at 325 n.9. 
"359 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1973), vacated and remanded, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(lower court instructed to consider conditional rescission award). 
1241 1 U.S. 356 (1973). 
l31d. at 375-76. 
'4359 F. Supp. at 1103, 1104; accord Douglas v. Beneficial Finance Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166 
(D. Alas. 1971) (granting rescission and damages but not addressing the issue directly), rev'd 
on other grounds, 469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972). 
I512 C.F.R. 8 226 (1974). 
16"Public position letters" is a classification conceived and used by I1 R. CLONTZ, TRUTH-IN- 
LENDING MANUAL E-2 (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as I1 R. CLONTZ] . The correspondence 
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lative history, the court concluded that the Act would not apply to "those 
lenders whose extensions of credit are an occasional, isolated, and inci- 
dental portion of their business,"l7 but that Reb Realty's credit activities 
were not so limited. 
The record indicated that Reb Realty was primarily a real estate 
broker arranging transactions between buyers and sellers of real prop- 
erty. On seven occasions during a period of 19 months, Reb Realty sold 
property on its own account. In three of these transactions Reb Realty 
extended credit. On the basis of these facts the court concluded that 
these credit sales were a significant aspect of Reb Realty's business and 
not so isolated and incidental as to exempt Reb Realty from the Act. The 
court reasoned that to hold otherwise might insulate a significant credit 
market from the Act's requirements, and that real estate brokers who 
deal constantly with credit would not likely be burdened or surprised by 
the Act's requirements. 
The court also reviewed the propriety of the lower court's award of 
both rescission and damages. Recognizing that no interrelation between 
the two sanctions is suggested by statute or legislative history, the court 
considered but rejected the position taken by Bostwick v.  Cohen that 
both remedies were remedial and only one could be elected. In Mourn- 
ing, the Supreme Court classified the damage section of the Act as a 
penalty, which overcame the Bostwick objection that such damages were 
remedial and thus inconsistent with an award of rescission. Moreover, 
in the court's view, to refuse damage awards where rescission was also 
granted would undermine the effectiveness of the Act. Thus the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's joint award of rescission and dam- 
ages.l8 The court nevertheless qualified its holding by stating that both 
remedies are not appropriate in all instances and that a court should 
use its equitable discretion to deny one of the remedies if harshness 
might result. 
This note will address the two major issues that faced the circuit court 
in Eby: (1) the meaning of "creditor" under the Act; and (2) the pro- 
priety of awarding both rescission and damages. 
referred to is issued by the Federal Reserve Board to help solve problems arising in inter- 
preting the Act. In 1970, letters numbered more than 1,000. Since then, approximately 852 of 
these letters have been given official numbers and indexed. These official letters are repre- 
sentative of the best correspondence. I1 R. CLONTZ; 4 CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE at 65,951. 
17495 F.2d at 649. 
18Zd. at 652. A review of the application of the rescission and damage sections of the Act 
shows that the district court erred in determining the amount of damages that should have 
been granted under the respective sections. The Ninth Circuit noted the possibility of error 
in granting rescission of the first mortgage but refused to take notice of it. Id. at 648 n.2. Be- 
cause rescission is limited to second liens, granting rescission of the first mortgage was clearly 
error. As a result, Eby was awarded $601 too much in the rescission award; this amount rep- 
resented payments made toward the first mortgage. See note 6 supra. See generally J .  ABRA- 
HAM, TRUTH IN REAL ESTATE LENDING $ 14.10 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABRAHAM] ; Aldridge, 
CASE NOTES 
111. ANALYSIS 
A .  Creditors 
The Truth in Lending Act defines creditors as those "who regularly 
extend, or arrange for the extension of, credit. "19 Regulation 220 defines 
a creditor as one who regularly extends credit "in the ordinary course of 
bu~ ines s . "~~  The only indication of the scope of these definitions is pro- 
vided by Senate and House reports of the Act explaining that the provi- 
sions were not to cover "a small retailer who extended credit . . . in an 
isolated instance to accommodate a particular customer. "22 
Evidence pertinent to these standards showed that Reb Realty com- 
pleted three credit transactions over a period of 19 months. The second 
credit transaction involved a loan of $4,200 to Eby for the purchase of 
a residential dwelling. With these facts before it, the Ninth Circuit con- 
cluded that these credit transactions were not "the type of isolated and 
incidental transactions the definition of creditor was meant to exempt. "23 
The court's affirmation of this issue initially appears to be well 
founded. In light of the Act's purpose of enhancing competition by dis- 
closure, a liberal construction of the Act's terms is a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ~ ~  The 
broad definitions contained in the public position letters also suggest a 
- -  - 
supra note 4, at 448-49; Heimbuch, Real Property- Truth in Lending, 49 M I C H .  B.J. Aug., 
1970, at 11, 14-15. The district court also miscalculated the amount of damages Eby was en- 
titled to under the civil liability section; this mistake was apparently not noticed by the circuit 
court. The  amount awarded was $478.82- twice the interest Eby paid. According to the 
applicable section, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970), see note 5 supra, Eby was entitled to twice the 
finance charge of the transaction, limited to a total award of $1,000. Considering the magni- 
tude of the transaction, $4,200 at 8 percent simple interest, conceivably Eby was entitled to the 
full $1,000, not just double the interest paid. As a result of this error, the civil liability award 
was probably deficient by $52 1.18. 
I t  is hard to understand why the court did not correct these two errors. Certainly the issue 
of damages was before the court. Confirmation of this result only adds confusion to the case 
law under the Act. 
1915 U.S.C. 8 1602(f) (1970). The definition in its entirety states: 
The term "creditor" refers only to creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for the 
extension of, credit for which the payment of a finance charge is required, whether in 
connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise. The provisions of this 
subchapter apply to any such creditor, irrespective of his or its status as a natural person 
or any type of organization. 
20Regulation Z is the title given to the regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board to 
implement the Act. 12 C.F.R. 5 226 (1974). 
2l12 C.F.R. 9 226.2(m) (1974). The definition in its entirety states: 
"Creditor" means a person who in the ordinary course of business regularly extends or 
arranges for the extension of consumer credit, or offers to extend or arrange for the ex- 
tension of such credit. 
22H.R. REP. NO. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1967); S. REP. NO. 392, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 13 (1967). 
23495 F.2d at 650. 
24See N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 
(1973). 
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liberal constr~ction.~5 Moreover, real estate brokers are not normally 
considered such small retailers as Congress apparently intended to ex- 
clude from the Act. Because of the magnitude of the brokers' trans- 
actions, the benefits of informed use of credit would seem to far outweigh 
the burdens of disclosure. This position presumes that brokers are con- 
stantly involved with credit matters and therefore have expertise neces- 
sary to implement the requirements of the Act.26 
Nevertheless, there are weaknesses in the court's application of its "oc- 
casional, isolated, and incidental" standard and in the court's assumption 
that brokers are likely to be familiar with the requirements of the Truth 
in Lending Act. 
1. Appl ica t ion  of standard. When the court determined that Reb 
Realty's transactions were not occasional and isolated, the court did not 
clearly delineate the impact of its decision. The court found Reb Realty 
a "creditor" on the basis of threecredit transactions. Yet, at the time Eby 
contracted with Reb Realty only one previous credit transaction had 
occurred, that taking place 6 months earlier. The third credit transaction 
was consummated 10 months later,Z7 2 months after Eby instituted her 
suit." Clearly, the court's conclusion would have rested on a more per- 
suasive factual foundation, if the third transaction had been challenged 
rather than the second. But, the court found it sufficient to find Reb 
Realty a "creditor" on two credit transactions with a third following. 
This finding implies that Reb Realty may have been a "creditor" at its 
very first credit transaction. This result was not made clear by the court. 
Because this standard for assessing whether an individual is a 
"creditor" was not made clear in the instant ca~e ,~9  a difficult burden has 
25See letters cited note 29 infra. 
26495 F.2d at 650. 
271d. at 648. 
28Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974). The third 
credit transaction may have been occasioned by the result of a default of the second credit 
transaction. The facts in the instant case indicate that out of the seven real estate transactions, 
one was necessitated by previous default. Only six lots were sold; the property involved in the 
instant case was sold twice. Brief for Appellee at 3, Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th 
Cir. 1974). It is therefore possible that Eby's default of the second credit transaction induced 
the third credit transaction. 
29The standards set by the public position letters for determining a creditor suggest no finer 
guidelines than do the statutory and regulatory definitions. One letter states that the standard 
for consideration is whether the credit transaction is "extremely isolated." Federal Reserve 
Board [hereinafter FRB] Letter No. 30, July 8, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS. 
CRED. GUIDE 7 30,086. This letter was in answer to an inquiry about the applicability of the 
Act to a hospital. The response indicated that allowing an account to be paid in more than 
four installments in an extremely isolated instance would not bring the hospital within the 
Act. A subsequent letter makes no mention as to frequency or num'bers except that exclusion 
would apply when the transactions were not an "integral" part of the lender's business. Federal 
Trade Commission [hereinafter FTC] Letter, August 1, 1969, [l969-19'74 Transfer Binder] 
CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 7 30,329. The letter states that a corporation is not a creditor within 
the Act when it makes incidental loans to its officers and directors. I t  concludes that the loans 
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been imposed on lenders that make infrequent loans. They must comply 
with the Act for each credit transaction even if subsequent transactions 
are not presently contemplated.30 If the lender does not comply with the 
Act's disclosure provisions and enters into subsequent credit transactions, 
he runs the risk of a court finding him to have been a "creditor" even on 
the first transaction. Therefore an occasional lender should comply with 
the Act's requirements or run the risk of having its credit transactions 
rescinded and damages awarded against it. 
The court's conclusion that the transactions involved large amounts 
of money and thus were a significant aspect of Reb Realty's business is 
questionable. A single residential credit transaction by a firm that regu- 
larly handles large amounts of money may be only an "incidental portion 
of [the firm's] business. "31 Although the purchase of a home is generally 
a major undertaking for a consumer, the sale is not necessarily a sig- 
nificant portion of the realtor's business. The court should have re- 
quired additional facts so that a comparison of Reb's questioned trans- 
actions with its total business revenues could be made to aid in deter- 
mining whether its credit extension was merely incidental in nature. 
The term "portion"suggests such a comparison; this comparison can only 
be made if such additional facts are kn0wn.3~ From the record of the case, 
were not made in the ordinary course of business, that they were not an integral part of the 
corporation's operations nor in furtherance of its business purpose. 
At most, the letters indicate that a lender could be exempt from the Act's mandates for 
plural credit transactions, FTC Letter, August 1, 1969, [ 1969-1 974 Transfer Binder] CCH 
CONS. CRED. GUIDE 1 30,329; FRB Letter No. 30, July 8, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] 
CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 1 30,086; the Board's letter cited by the court in the instant case con- 
templated protection from the Act for "casud isolated sales." FRB Letter No. 261, February 
19, 1970, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 1 30,313 (emphasis added). 
As a result the court may have placed too heavy a reliance on the public position letters even 
though such letters are sometimes disregarded as simply one man's view. See Ratner v. Chemi- 
cal Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also FRB Letter 
No. 444, March 1, 1971, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 1 30,640. One 
example, showing the letters' limited worth, is provided by FRB Letter No. 396, August 7, 
1970, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 130,580. There, a letter con- 
dudes that ordinarily a dealer in real estate is a creditor within the definition of Regulation 
2. The flaw in this conclusion is obvious. The definition of "dealer in real property" would 
theoretically deserve the same type of analysis as does "creditor" under the Act: how many 
and how frequent need transactions be to make a dealer a "dealer"? This letter was not cited 
by the court although it was brought to its attention by Eby's counsel. Brief for Appellee at 5, 
Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974). The court concluded that though the 
letters are hardly binding, they do represent an  experienced judgment to which a court might 
properly refer. 
30FRB Letter No. 161, October 17, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS. CRED. 
GUIDE 1 30,190. 
3l495 F.2d at 649 (emphasis added). 
32An additional question raised as to the "incidental" aspect of the court's standard is 
whether it is measured in monetary terms or  in terms of business activity. This type of ap- 
proach would correspond much closer to a literal reading of the statutory and regulatory 
definition of a "creditor." This type of analysis is suggested by a Federal Trade Commission 
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then, it appears that additional evidence may have impelled the court to 
a finding contrary to the one it reached. Summary judgment was im- 
proper in this case. Even if the possibility of the contrary finding were 
only marginal, doubt would properly be resolved by remand for full 
trial. 
2. Business or private lender. In construing the definition of "credi- 
tor," the court concluded that a realtor is "likely to be familiar with the 
general requirements of the Act."33 This reference to the realtor's fa- 
miliarity with the Act may be an overstatement. In the majority of trans- 
actions the realtor has no obligation to disclose. First, he does not gen- 
erally extend credit; rather, credit is provided by financial institutions. 
Second, he does not generally arrange credit under the terms of the Act.34 
Thus, the realtor is not "likely" to know the requirements of the Truth in 
Lending Act. 
The  court also concluded that to exempt Reb Realty "might well in- 
sulate a significant credit market from the Act."s5 However, the statutory 
and regulatory definitions of a "creditor" do not provide for a determina- 
tion of the issue on the basis of the market affected. If Congress had been 
concerned with inclusion of the various credit markets, it could have 
required disclosure in all instances where credit is extended. Surely the 
court would not require homeowners selling their homes on contract to 
comply with the Act on the ground that to do otherwise would "insulate 
a significant credit market from the Act. "36 Exclusion of significant 
credit markets, then, is not a sufficiently compelling public policy basis 
for the court's decision. 
A more justifiable position for the court would have been to review the 
individual lender's expertise and familiarity with the Act's requirements. 
These facts are crucial regardless of whether the lender is a business or 
private lender.37 Each alleged creditor is entitled to equal consideration 
letter which indicates that a corporation is not a creditor within the meaning of the Act when 
it makes incidental loans to its officers and directors; dollar amounts of the loans are not con- 
sidered. FTC Letter, August 1, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 
TI 30,329. 
33495 F.2d at 650. 
3412 C.F.R. 5 226.2(f) (1974); ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 13-14. Only when a broker ar- 
ranges credit for a fee or participates with the lender in the preparation of credit documents 
must he disclose. Even if he should arrange credit for a homeowner he is exempted from the 
requirements of the Act because an "arranger" must arrange credit for a "creditor." 
35495 F.2d at 650. 
3 ~ .  
s7An initial problem is determining a point of separation between the business sector and 
the private sector. How many transactions by a private individual are sufficient to place him 
in the business sector? The same problem exists under the tax laws; those engaged in business 
are entitled to ordinary business deductions including bad debt losses under INT. REV. CODE OF 
1954, $5  165, 166; see, e.g., Mercer v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1967) (intent of 
taxpayer determinative of whether carrying on trade or business); Hickerson v. Commissioner, 
229 F.2d 631 (2nd Cir. 1956) (determination of business loss dependent upon relation loss 
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of the facts relevant to its situation.38 In this case the court did not have 
sufficient factual basis for its conclusion that Reb Realty "likely" had 
knowledge of the Act's requirements. Remanding the case to the district 
court for findings on this point would have been appropriate. 
B. Remedies 
With the creditor issue resolved against Reb Realty, the court next 
reviewed the propriety of the lower court's award of both rescission and 
damages. The problem of selecting appropriate remedies is inherent in 
the Truth in Lending Act because it fails to define the interrelation of 
rescission and damages.39 The court in the instant case, reviewing the 
election of remedies doctrine,40 concluded that the two remedies were 
not inconsistent and that the award of both rescission and damages was a 
proper exercise of the district court's discretionary power.41 
1. Rescission. The Act provides for the rescission upon demand, with 
certain exceptions, within 3 days of consummation of a transaction when 
a security interest in any residential real property is obtained or ac- 
q ~ i r e d . ~ ~  An examination of the legislative history shows that rescission 
was a hasty addition to the Truth in Lending Act. This provision first 
appeared after a joint Senate and House conference to resolve differences 
between the Senate and House versions of the Act." Its predecessor, in- 
troduced by Representative Cahill, required disclosure of credit terms 3 
days before consummation when secured transactions involved resi- 
bears to trade or business); First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 141 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ("iso- 
lated" or "occasional" activities do not constitute a business). This approach under the in- 
ternal Revenue Code suggests that all expenses, even those of a business, are not "business" 
expenses allowable under the Code. It is arguable that a lender need not fall within the 
"creditor" definition until he has also engaged in a business under the Internal Revenue 
Code. The  Truth in Lending Act is concerned with different issues but the Act does recognize 
that a creditor need not be a "creditor" within the Act for all his transactions. FRB Letter No. 
161, October 17, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 7 30,190. As 
courts weigh relevant factors under the Internal Revenue Code, so should they weigh factors 
under the Truth in Lending Act. See Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of 
Coverage, 24 STAN. L. REV. 793,823-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Warren & Larmore] . 
38Warren & Larmore at 823-24 (suggesting expertise and familiarity should be considered 
in determining the "creditor" issue). But c j  FRB Letter No. 261, February 19, 1970, [1969- 
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 7 30, 31 3. 
39See Comment, Private Remedies Under the Truth-in-Lending Act: The  Relationship 
Between Rescission and Civil Liability, 57 IOWA L. REV. 199 (197 1) [hereinafter cited as Pri- 
vate Remedies] ; 1971 TOLEDO L. REV. 573. A similar problem arises under state versions of 
the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE. Generally the rescission and damage sections of the 
Truth in Lending Act were adopted by the UCCC verbatim. Consequently the Code also fails 
to define the interrelation between the two provisions. See e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. $8 28-35-203 
to -204 (Supp. 5A 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. $8 70B-5-203 to -204 (Supp. 7B 1973). 
40See note 10 supra. 
4l495 F.2d at 652. 
4215 U.S.C. 8 1635(a) (1970); see note 6 supra. 
43H.R. REP. NO. 1397,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1968). 
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dential real property.44 Cahill intended the provision to end "vicious 
secondary mortgage s~hemes"~5 by allowing the consumer additional 
time to contemplate the seriousness of the obligations to be undertaken 
in these transactions. 
The House adoption of Cahill's proposal indicates concern for the 
consumer in residential real property transactions, but there is nothing 
to explain why the joint conference adopted the right of rescission in- 
stead.46 There are, however, two logical reasons for the conference 
change. First, consumers under Cahill's proposal were given 3 days prior 
to consummation of a transaction in which to consider the terms dis- 
closed. This was to be accomplished in the privacy and unhurried at- 
mosphere of the consumer's home. Yet, the pressures of zealous salesmen 
might still exist in this setting. In contrast, the Act presently provides the 
right to rescind for 3 days after the transaction is completed. Without the 
continued influence and possible harassment of a salesman, a consumer 
is much more likely to give the transaction the serious thought it de- 
serves. This is most effectively encouraged by the present rescission sec- 
tion. Second, many consumers, even if not pressured by sales tactics, 
never fully realize the consequences of their acts until those acts are com- 
pleted and the first payment is imminent. Only then do they carefully 
consider what they have done. The 3-day right of rescission provides 
time for reconsideration. 
Legislative concern for the consumer's rights, reflected in the hastily 
added right of rescission, strongly suggests that the section is remedial in 
nature. This conclusion is bolstered when the effects of rescission are 
considered. The consumer is no longer liable under the agreement and 
receives all money and property previously conveyed to the credit0r.~7 
There are punitive characteristics within the rescission section, how- 
ever. As long as a creditor fails to disclose according to the Act's require- 
ments, rescission is available to the debtor.48 Most interpretations of the 
, rescission section indicate there is no statute of limitationsY49 so that if 
proper disclosure is not made, rescission conceivably could be had at any 
441 14 CONG. &c. 1610-1 1 ( 1  968) (remarks of Representative Cahill). 
451d. at 161 1. 
4 6 B ~ t  see K. XlcLean, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 199, 206 
(1968) (suggesting enactment of recent door-to-door sales acts influenced the change). 
"15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1970); see note 6 supra. 
4 ~ .  
49See FRB Letter KO. 362, June 29, 1970, [1969-19'74 Transfer Binder] CCH CONS. CRED. 
GUIDE ll 30,424; FRB Letter No. 235, January 30, 1970, [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH 
CONS. CRED. GUIDE ll 30,268; FRB Letter No. 219, December 30, 1969, [1969-1974 Transfer 
Binder] CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE 7 30,245; see Aldridge, supra note 4, at 448. But see Wachtel 
v. West, 476 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.), eel-t. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1 973) (suggesting laches and 
estoppel may be interposed as defenses); ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 5 14.8 [4] (suggesting 
state statutes of limitation may apply). 
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time in the future. In addition, if a creditor fails to act on the consumer's 
proper demand for rescission, the creditor will forfeit his property with- 
out compensation from the consumer.50 In such a situation the con- 
sumer is the recipient of a windfall, and the creditor is penalized for fail- 
ure to comply with the rescission section. But as long as the creditor does 
not disregard his duties under the Act, the remedial characteristics of the 
section are more significant than the penal characteristics. 
2. Damages. Civil damages may be imposed for failure to comply with 
the Act's disclosure requirements.S1 The legislative history shows that 
the civil liability section of the Act was contemplated by both Houses of 
Congress prior to adoption of the final bill. This history provides some 
aid to interpreting this section. 
Under the Senate version of the Act, primary enforcement of the Act's 
requirements was to be accomplished by institution of private civil ac- 
tions under authority of the civil liability section. Creditors who failed 
to disclose, as required by the Act, would be subject to the "penalty" of 
this section.s2 In contrast, the House version anticipated that many un- 
sophisticated consumers would not be provided adequate protection 
under the Act except through administrative enforcement. As a result, 
the House version provided that primary enforcement of the Act was to 
be accomplished by various federal agencies,53 with secondary enforce- 
ment coming from the civil liability section.54 Recoveries under the 
House version of the civil liability section were also classified as "pen- 
alties. "55 
As a result of this joint concern for effective enforcement, the Act, as 
adopted, provides for both administrative and private enforcement.56 
Thus enactment of the civil liability section was to provide a further 
deterrent to those seeking to avoid the disclosure requirements of the 
This concern for enforcement of the Act, rather than for compen- 
sation of injured consumers, suggests that the civil liability section is 
penal in nature rather than remedial. 
Other characteristics of the section also indicate its penal nature. 
These include its arbitrary minimum and maximum limits for recovery, 
use of a double multiple to compute amount of recovery, the defenses 
provided by the section, the provisions allowing recovery of attorney's 
5015 U.S.C. 5 1635(b) (1970). 
5l15 U.S.C. 5 1640(a) (1970); see note 5 supra. 
5%. REP. NO. 392,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1 967). 
53Primary enforcement was to be accomplished primarily through fines and imprisonment. 
54H.R. REP. NO. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1967). 
5jId. at 19. 
5615 U.S.C. $5 1607, 1640 (1970). 
57See Private Remedies, supra note 39, at 209. 
222 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
fees to encourage actions under its provisions, and finally, its lack of re- 
lation to actual consumer damage.58 
There are, nevertheless, remedial characteristics in the section.59 
These characteristics are more apparent if discussed in a context where 
rescission is not available as a remedy. Where the'tivil liability section is 
the only section providing a recovery for violations of the Act, part of the 
recovery may offset actual damages. But since proof of actual damage is 
not necessary for recovery under the Act, the argument that the section 
is remedial becomes weak.60 Indeed, in view of its legislative classifica- 
tion, its purpose, and its characteristics, it appears the civil liability sec- 
tion's penal nature far outweighs its remedial nature. 
3. Remedy application. The court in the instant case concluded that 
the rescission and civil liability sections are not mutually exclusive and 
that a consumer should not be required to elect between the two. In 
Bostwick the district court observed: "It is possible, of course, to view the 
civil liability section of the Act as being punitive in nature rather than 
remedial. Such a view would lead to the conclusion that the election of 
remedies concept had no application . . . ."G1 This view is strongly sup- 
ported by the Supreme Court's classification of damages under the civil 
liability section as a civil penalty.62 Thus the Ninth Circuit's affirmation 
of the district court's award appears well founded.63 
The court, however, added a caveat for future cases: " [W] e think a 
request for both forms of relief is addressed to a court's sense of equity 
and may properly be denied in appropriate cases. "64 The court was con- 
cerned with the harshness that might result from recoveries under both 
the rescission and damage sections and agreed that an award of both 
would not be appropriate in all  instance^.^^ 
There are at least two situations where an award of both remedies 
might be inappropriate. They are directly related to the rescission sec- 
tion and its two punitive characteristics previously discussedd66 First, 
rescission is available indefinitely if the Act's requirements of disclosure 
are not met.67 Certainly over a period of time the harshness of granting 
rescission against a creditor increases. If the period between consumma- 
58See id. at 208-09; 1971 TOLEDO L. REV. 573,581-84. 
59See Private Remedies, supra note 39, at 208-09; 197 1 TOLEDO L. REV. 573, 581-84. 
6oSee 197 1 TOLEDO L. REV. 573,580. 
61319 F. Supp. at 877. 
62Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 41 1 U.S. 356, 375-76 (1973). 
63See Griffith, Truth-in-Lending and Real Estate Transactions: Some Aspects, 2 OHIO N.L.  
REV. 1, 15-17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Griffith] ; Private Remedies, supra note 39, at 214; 
197 1 TOLEDO L. REV. 573,584-85. 
64495 F.2d at 652. 
651d. 
66See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra. 
6715 U.S.C. $ 1635(a) (1970); see note 6 supra. 
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tion and rescission is great, an award of damages may indeed be unduly 
burdensome. Second, if a creditor fails to take the necessary steps to 
effectuate the consumer's rescission, the consumer is allowed to keep the 
property without obligation.68 In such a case an additional award of 
damages may actually subject a creditor to two penalties; the caveat seeks 
to avoid this result. 
Judge Wright, Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, stated in Palmer v. 
Wilson: " [He] would limit the court's equitable discretion [to refuse a 
monetary award] to cases where a civil penalty would be an inequitable 
windfall to an overreaching [consumer] . "69 The two previous examples 
would fall within this category. 
Allowing courts this discretionary power will have little effect upon 
the Act. The creditor is deterred in any event. He must disclose accord- 
ing to the Act's requirements, for a court would surely award penalties 
regardless of any resulting harshness if he deliberately fails to disclose. 
The ever-present threat of both sanctions insures creditor adherence to 
the Act; without this threat rescission might not be sufficient to enforce 
disclosure compliance.70 
Criminal Procedure - PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS -REQUIRING 
THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD OF PROOF AND THE APPLICATION OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRINCIPLES -Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405, 
5 18 P.2d 721 (1974). 
Daryl Standlee, a Washington State parolee,' was charged with abduc- 
tion, assault, attempted rape, and molesting a minor. Proceedings to 
suspend his parole began following the charges but were stayed pending 
a criminal trial. Even though Standlee was acquitted at trial on an alibi 
defense, the prison authorities, considering the same evidence, ruled he 
had violated his parole and revoked it. The only factual issue in either 
proceeding was the identity of the assailant. Standlee sought a writ of 
habeas corpus, contending that collateral estoppel2 prevented the reliti- 
6815 U.S.C. 5 1635(b) (1970). This result was reached in Sosa v .  Fite, 498 F .  2d 114 (5th Cir. 
1974), where 2 years after siding was installed on a consumer's residence the consumer was 
allowed to rescind the transaction because disclosure of credit terms had not been made. Be- 
cause of the creditor's failure to effectuate rescission the consumer was allowed to keep the 
siding without obligation. In addition, it should be noted that the consumer was awarded 
attorney's fees even though the rescission section of the Act does not provide for them. 
69502 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1974) (Judge Wright, concurring in part and dissenting in  
part). Judge Wright dissented from the majority conclusion that a court could condition 
rescission on repayment by a debtor. He stated the right to rescind was unconditional. 
'Osee Boyd at 182-83; Griffith at 16-17; Private Remedies, supra note 39, at 207. 
'Standlee's prior conviction was for rape. Petitioner's Brief for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 
iv, Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405,518 P.2d 721 (1974). 
2 
Res Judicata necessitates an identity of causes of action, while the invocation of collateral 
estoppel does not. . . . Where there is a second action between the parties, or their privies, 
